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JACQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER, 
Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Appellate Court No. 20060292 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The wife should be awarded an interest in the business known as Stoney Motors. 
The Husband's and Wife's business, Stoney Motors, was created during the marriage 
and should have been equitably divided by the Court, regardless of whether or not it 
included good will attributed to the husband. The Trial Court inappropriately relied upon 
the reasoning in the case of Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) which 
applied to a professional corporation where the income was used to pay significant 
amounts of alimony and child support. The Court should have equitably divided the 
value of the business, including its good will, in accordance with the rule of the Court in 
Gardner v.Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah App. 1991). 
II 
The Husband should be required to pay one-half (Vi) of the $52,000.00 loan owed to 
Mr. Carl Manzel 
The Husband and Wife paid off their credit card debts in 2001 with a loan from the 
wife's father. The credit card debts were for bills the parties jointly incurred and included 
debts incurred from gambling. Both the wife and husband were present during the time 
these gambling debts were incurred. The parties separated twice after this loan was made 
and each time reconciled their marriage. The Trial Court found that the husband knew 
about the debts and by reconciling with the wife, forgave her of any debts that were 
incurred prior to the date of reconciliation. The Court denied the husband's claim that he 
should be excused from paying a portion of the marital debts because of dissipation and 
found that any debts incurred during the marriage before the final separation, which was 
in July 31, 2003, should be divided equally. The Court's conclusion that the Wife should 
be solely responsible for the $52,000.00 dollar loan to her father is inconsistent with the 
Court's findings and should be reversed. 
Ill 
Attorney's Fees 
The Wife was awarded attorney's fees at the Trial level and should be awarded 
attorney's fees on Appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
The wife should be awarded an interest in the business known as Stoney Motors. 
The Trial Court concluded that Stoney Motors, a car dealership, should 
not be divided as a marital asset because its value included the good will of the husband. 
The Court found "The Petitioner claims the dealership has no value for good will, and 
therefore, the wife is not entitled to any monitory compensation from the dealership." (F. 
of Fct. f 13). The Court concluded "The court finds that the Respondent is not entitled to 
receive any portion of Stoney Motors as a marital asset. The court finds that the good 
will of Stoney Motors is solely attributable to the Petitioner's personal, professional 
reputation. The Respondent is not awarded anything for the good will of Stoney Motors." 
(F. of Fct. f 24). An Appellant Court gives deference to a Finding of Fact because the 
Trial Court judges the creditability of witnesses. However, a Conclusion on Law is 
reviewed for correctness and given no special deference. Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Court did not find that the dealership had no value because of good will. 
Paragraph 13 of the Court's Findings of Fact, states that the Husband claims that it has no 
value for good will. The Court found that Chuck Ulrich an accountant testifying on 
behalf of the Wife valued the business at $200,000.00. (F. of Fct. f 14) The Court 
concluded that the good will of Stoney Motors resulted solely from the Husband's 
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personal and professional reputation, and that the Wife should not be awarded anything 
for the good will of Stoney Motors. (F. of Fct. f^ 24) The Court did not conclude that the 
entire value of Stoney Motors was good will. The wife's accountant, Chuck Ulrich took 
into consideration that the business was run personally by the husband in his evaluation of 
the business. (Vol V. Tr. 829-831) The Court made no determination of what portion of 
the value of Stoney Motors was for good will. 
Stoney Motors is a used car dealership that was created in the year 2001 as a Limited 
Liability Company. The wife was a 50% owner of Stoney Motors. (F. of Fct. f 7, 8, and 
10) The husband in his reply brief argues the facts related to the evaluation of the 
business. If the husband wants to challenge the factual findings of the Court, he must 
marshall all evidence in favor of the position of the wife. Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431, 
437 (Utah App.1999) The value of the business is not the issue before this Court on the 
wife's cross appeal. The issue is whether or not good will in a non-professional business 
should be divided by the Trial Court. That is an issue of law. An issue of law is not 
entitled to any deference on Appeal. Howell Supra. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Gardner v. Gardner 748,P2 1076, 1079 (Utah App. 
1988) stated "...Thus, marital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived; and this 
includes any such pension fund or insurance.' Englert v Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 
1978)." The Court also stated in the second paragraph of footnote 1, on page 1080 "The 
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ability of a business to generate income from its continued patronage is commonly 
referred to as good will. Good will is properly subject to equitable distribution upon 
divorce, "see, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2 1 (1983); Matter of Marriage 
ofFleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see The Treatment of Good Will 
in Divorce Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984)." The same statement of law was made 
by the Court of Appeals in the case of Dunn v. Dunn 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App. 
1990). This rule has long been the law in the State of Utah. The Supreme Court in case 
of Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) made an exception to this rule when 
the company was a professional corporation where the income of that corporation was 
used to pay significant amounts of alimony and child support to the spouse. That case is 
discussed in detail in point nine of the Appellee's Cross Appeal. 
The question before this Court is a legal question as to whether or not good will in a 
non professional business is subject to division by the Trial Court. Most small non-
professional businesses include a significant value for good will. The fact that a business 
contains good will should not be a basis upon which a Trial Court can refuse to divide the 
value of the business. Otherwise, in many divorce actions, a Court would have to exclude 
the value of businesses that are created during the course of the marriage. 
The failure of this Court to reverse the Trial Court's decision would result in the 
decision of the Court in the Sorenson case, which specifically related to a professional 
corporation, being extended to all small business that involves good will. The wife 
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contends that was not the intent nor the ruling in the Sorenson case, and that the Trial 
Court's reliance upon the Sorenson case to deny the wife any portion of the automobile 
business, created by the parties during the course of their marriage, is an incorrect 
application of law. 
II 
The Husband should be required to pay one-half (Vi) of the $52,000.00 loan owed to 
Mr. Carl Manzel. 
The loan from the wife's father, Carl Manzel was made in 2001 to pay off credit cards 
ofboth the Wife and Husband. (VolVITr. 1090:10-1092:22) The loan was made to the 
parties before their first and second separation. (Vol IV Tr. 652) The Trial Court in its 
findings denied the husband's claim that he should be excused from paying a portion of 
the marital debts because of dissipation. (F. of Fct.| 51) The Court also found that any 
debts incurred during the marriage and before the final separation, which was July 31, 
2003, should be divided equally regardless of who incurred the debt or loan. (F of Fct. % 
73) The Court found that the husband knew about the debts incurred during the marriage. 
(F of Fct. % 74) The Court found that the parties reconciled after their first and second 
separation and that the husband forgave the wife for any debts incurred during those 
separations and thus those debts became marital debts to be divided equally. (F of Fct. | 
75 and 76) 
The husband claims that the $52,000.00 loan from Carl Manzel was for gambling 
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debts. The Court made so such finding. The husband's accountant prepared a document 
entitled "Jackie Stonehocker's Cash Flow 1999-2004" which is attached as Exhibit 3 to 
the husband's Appeal Brief. The wife disputed much of the information in that 
document. However, that document shows that monies were expended for gambling in 
1999 in the sum of $43,130.00, in 2000 in the sum of $10,300, in 2001 in the sum of 
$1,675.00, and additional amounts for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004. That document 
shows that there were credit card payments in 1999 in the sum of $30,921.00, in 2000 in 
the sum of $8,925.00 and in 2001 in the sum of $6,992.00. It is clear that these debts 
were incurred prior to the loan from the wife's father, Carl Manzel in the 2001. The 
wife's testimony during the course of the trial was that the husband was present with her 
when she went to Wendover and that the parties not only experienced losses but gains 
from gambling which were reported on their income tax returns. (Vol IV Tr. 694 line 7 -
697 line 18) The Court found that the husband forgave the wife for any of those debts 
and they were to be divided equally. 
The husband in his Reply Brief cites language from the Court in the September 25, 
2005 hearing that the Court got the impression that the loan was to pay off gambling 
debts. The Court did not receive any evidence at the September 25, 2005 hearing. 
During the course of the trial, the Wife's attorney objected to the husband's questions 
concerning the debts that were paid off with the loan from the wife's father. In 
commenting on relevance, the Court stated "It isn't to me. It may be the grounds for the 
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Divorce, but I don't know why it makes any difference." (Vol VI Tr. 1193 Line 19-20) 
"See, I guess my question is, if they loaned her $52,000.00, does it really matter what it 
was spent for?" (Vol VI Tr. 1194 line 19-21) The Court also commented that not all the 
loan was for gambling debts. (Vol V Tr. 1196 line 6) Based upon findings made by the 
Court there is no basis for the Court to require the wife to be solely responsible for the 
$52,000.00 debt to her father. The Court's conclusion that the wife is solely responsible 
for the $52,000.00 loan to her father is inconsistent with the finding and should be 
reversed by this Court. 
Ill 
Attorney's Fees 
The wife was awarded attorney fees by the Trial Court and she has requested that this 
Court awarded her attorney's fees on appeal. The husband in his Reply Brief raises for 
the first time that the motion which resulted in the July 5, 2005, hearing was not brought 
under Rules 54(a), 59(a) or 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The husband in 
his Reply Brief Statement of Facts acknowledges that a Memorandum Decision was 
signed by Judge Jones on the 5th day of July 2005 and thereafter the wife filed a Motion 
for Clarification on the 10th day of August 2005 and the husband filed a Motion for 
Clarification and to Review the Memorandum Decision on the 11th day of August 2005. 
(Page 3 of the husband's Reply Brief). The same information is contained in the wife's 
Brief under Statements of the Case on pages three and four. The husband and wife both 
8 
joined in Motions asking the Court to clarify, review, and/or modify its Memorandum 
Decision. The husband relies upon the Trial Court's comments in the September 25, 
2005 hearing to support point two in his Reply Memorandum, where he quotes comments 
made by the Trial Judge at that hearing. 
The husband cannot participate in an agreed upon hearing to clarify and/or modify the 
Court Memorandum Decision and then on Appeal for the first time claim that the Court's 
Clarification of its Memorandum Decision cannot be relied upon or is not binding on the 
parties. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Trial Court committed an error of Law in failing to divide the business known as 
Stoney Motors because it included good will of the husband. The Court's reasoning in 
the case of Sorenson Supra, which applied to a professional corporation where the 
income of the corporation was used to pay a significant amount of alimony and child 
support is not applicable to the Stoney Motors' business which buys and sells used 
automobiles. 
The Court made no findings which justified its conclusion that the wife should be 
solely responsible for a debt from her father in the sum of $52,000.00 which was used to 
pay off credit cards incurred by both the wife and husband. The findings all support a 
conclusion that each party should be responsible for one-half QA) of the debt owed to the 
wife's father. 
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The Wife was awarded attorney's fees by the Trial Court. The Wife requests that this 
Court award her attorney's fees on Appeal. 
DATED this day of June 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee/ 
Cross Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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